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MOTIONS FOR ACQUITTAL

a fine of fifty dollars by the superior court was not shocking enough by
itself to compel the conclusion that the increased sentence had been
motivated by judicial vindictiveness. The Colten Court therefore required some evidence indicating why the superior court had treated the
defendant any differently or more severely than defendants originally
before the court.5 In Pearcethe increased sentence itself was sufficient.
In Colten the Court found the increased sentence insufficient without
more evidence. Whether the Court was motivated by the factual distinctions between the two types of appeals or by the belief that such a
decision was required to preserve the effectiveness of the inferior court
system, the rationale for the decision is debatable.
The effects of Colten on the practical operation of the inferior court
system remain to be seen. Whether a criminal defendant convicted in
an inferior court will now more readily accept the sentence of the lower
court or whether inferior court judges will become more disposed to
offer lenient sentences as an incentive to defendants to accept their
judgment as final cannot be predicted. Yet two effects of this decision
are certain: the benefits of the inferior court system in terms of facilitating the efficient administration of criminal justice have been protected
from one possible threat of erosion, and the potential threat of isolated
instances of vindictive sentencing in less serious criminal cases has not
been eradicated.
ROBERT

Louis QUICK

Criminal Procedure-Use of the Reasonable Doubt Standard in Ruling
on a Motion for Judgment of Acquittal
Rule 29(a) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure instructs the
trial judge to "order the entry of judgment of acquittal of one or more
offenses charged in the indictment or information after the evidence on
either side is closed if the evidence is insufficient to sustain a conviction
of such offense or offenses."' For many years the various federal courts
of appeals set different standards for a trial judge in ruling on motions
for judgment of aquittal. However, the recent decision in UnitedStates
1192 S.Ct. at 1960.
'FED. R. CRII. P. 29(a).
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v. Taylor2 has brought uniformity3 among all of the circuits with regard
to the judicial standard of evidence necessary to allow jury consideration
of a criminal charge.' In that case Judge Friendly writing for the Second
Circuit overruled the so-called "Second Circuit doctrine," 5 promulgated
by Judge Learned Hand, which provided that the standard of evidence
necessary for a trial judge to deny a motion for a directed verdict in a
civil suit and to disallow a motion for judgment of acquittal in a criminal
case were identical.
A motion for judgment of acquittal can be made after the prosecution closes, after both sides rest, or after the jury returns an adverse
verdict.' The trial judge is then compelled to rule as a matter of law7 on
the sufficiency of the prosecution's evidence.' The issue in controversy
among the various Courts of Appeals9 had been the proper standard to
apply in assessing whether the prosecution had produced a sufficient
quantum of evidence to justify presentation of the case to the jury. The
standard now uniformly adopted was announced by Judge Prettyman
in Curley v. United States:10
The true rule, therefore, is that a trial judge, in passing upon a
motion for directed verdict of acquittal, must determine whether upon
the evidence, giving full play to the right of the jury to determine
credibility, weigh the evidence, and draw justifiable inferences of fact,
a reasonable mind might fairly conclude guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt. If he concludes that upon the evidence there must be such a
doubt in a reasonable mind, he must grant the motion; ....
By 1967, all the courts of appeals except the Second Circuit had adopted
this standard."
2464 F.2d 240 (2d Cir. 1972).
'See text accompanying note II infra.
4
Actually, the overruling of the "Second Circuit doctrine," see text accompanying note 5 infra,
was dictum as the defendant's conviction was affirmed on the ground that the evidence against
him was sufficient to pass the newly adopted and more stringent test. 464 F.2d at 245.
'See text accompanying note 12 infra.
'FED. R. CRIM. P. 29(a), (c).
7
See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 29(a); 5 R. ANDERSON, WHARTON'S CRIMINAL LAW AND
PROCEDURE §§ 2073, 2076 (1957).
'FED. R. CRIM. P. 29(a).
'See, e.g., Hays v. United States, 231 F. 106, 108 (8th Cir. 1916), affd, 242 U.S. 470 (1917).
"°160 F.2d 229, 232 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 837 (1947).
"See, e.g., Parker v. United States, 378 F.2d 641 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 842 (1967);
United States v. Allard, 240 F.2d 840 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 939 (1957); United States
v. Sherman, 421 F.2d 539 (4th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 914 (1970); United States
v. Crane, 445 F.2d 509 (5th Cir. 1971); United States v. Collon, 426 F.2d 939 (6th Cir. 1970);
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The "Second Circuit doctrine" was most notably expressed in
2
United States v. Feinberg:1
[T]he standard of evidence necessary to send a case to the jury is the
same in both civil and criminal cases; and . . . ,given evidence from
which a reasonable person might conclude that the charge in an indictment was proved, the court will look no further, the jury must decide,
and the accused must be content with the instruction that before finding him guilty they must exclude all reasonable doubt.
The doctrine became fixed as the only applicable standard in the
Second Circuit in United States v. Valenti 3 and United States v.
Feinberg,'4 decided in 1943 and 1944 respectively. 5 The latter opinion,
written by Judge Learned Hand, became the leading authority for the
doctrine, perhaps because of its distinguished author and its original
expression of justification for the standard.'6 Judge Hand reaffirmed
this standard in United States v. Andolschek: 7 "The accused at bar do
not argue that the evidence was not strong enough to support a verdict
in a civil case, and it certainly was; that being true, our review ends."
The tenor of this statement confirms the conclusiveness of the acceptance of the "Second Circuit doctrine" by its namesake court. Nevertheless, the issue was continually reviewed 8 and attacked. 9 Finally, in
United States v. Taylor1 the Second Circuit overruled Feinberg and
United States v. Williams, 311 F.2d 721 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 812 (1963); Conaway v.

United States, 349 F.2d 907 (8th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S. 976 (1966); United States v.
Brown, 436 F.2d 702 (9th Cir. 1970); United States v. Parrott, 434 F.2d 294 (10th Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 401 U.S. 979 (1971); United States v. Harris, 435 F.2d 74 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
402 U.S. 986 (1971).
12140 F.2d 592, 594 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 322 U.S. 726 (1944).
"134 F.2d 362 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 319 U.S. 761 (1943).
14140 F.2d 592 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 322 U.S. 726 (1944).
"This doctrine had its origins in Looker v. United States, 240 F. 932 (2d Cir. 1917); Felder
v. United States, 9 F.2d 872 (2d Cir. 1925), cert. denied, 270 U.S. 648 (1926); and United States
v. Rowe, 56 F.2d 747 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 286 U.S. 554 (1932). However, a standard more like
the Curley rule had apparently been adopted in Fraina v. United States, 255 F. 28 (2d Cir. 1918).
Even after the "Second Circuit doctrine" had been in effect, the Second Circuit sometimes appeared to revert back to the Fraina criterion. See, e.g., United States v. Silva, 109 F.2d 531 (2d
Cir. 1940); United States v. Wishnatzki, 77 F.2d 357 (2d Cir. 1935).
"6United States v. Masiello, 325 F.2d 279, 288 (2d Cir. 1956) (Frank, J., concurring).
17142 F.2d 503, 505 (2d Cir. 1944).
"E.g., United States v. Costello, 221 F.2d 668, 671 (2d Cir. 1955), affd, 350 U.S. 359 (1956).
"9 United States v. Masiello, 235 F.2d 279, 284-85 (2d Cir. 1956) (Frank, J., concurring);

United States v. Gonzales Castro, 228 F.2d 807, 808 (2d Cir. 1956) (Frank, J., concurring).
"464 F.2d 240 (2d Cir. 1972).
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insured uniformity 2l among the circuits by adopting the Curley test.

An examination of the rationale behind the "Second Circuit doctrine" clearly supports the decision of the court in Taylor to abandon

the doctrine. Judge Learned Hand had offered two reasons for refusing
to differentiate "between evidence which should satisfy reasonable men,
and the evidence which should satisfy reasonable men beyond a reasonable doubt. ' 22 The first was that "courts-at least federal courts-have
generally declared that the standard of evidence necessary to send a case
to the jury is the same in both civil and criminal cases .... "23 The
"A caveat must be entered about the uniformity of standard that now prevails. Some circuits
hold that a special rule must be applied to cases involving circumstantial evidence. This standard,
enunciated most clearly in Isbell v. United States, 227 F. 788, 792 (8th Cir. 1915), quoting Union
Pacific Coal Co. v. United States, 173 F. 737, 740 (8th Cir. 1909), is as follows: "Unless there is
substantial evidence of facts which excludes every other hypothesis but that of guilt it is the duty
of the trial judge to instruct the jury to return a verdict for the accused, and where all the substantial
evidence is as consistent with innocence as with guilt it is the duty of the appellate court to reverse
a judgment against him."
There are interpretations of this statement which indicate that a more stringent standard than
the Curley rule has been established. For example, the Isbell test could mean that the trial judge
must grant a motion for acquittal unless the evidence excludes the hypothesis of innocence. The
standard could be defined as requiring a reversal of all convictions rendered in cases in which a
reasonable mind could reach either a guilty or innocent verdict. However, neither of these interpretations are plausible because of their impracticality. See Curley v. United States, 160 F.2d 229,
232 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 837 (1947). They must be dismissed on the further ground
that such interpretations would force the trial judge to preempt the functions of the jury by
becoming a trier of fact before submission of the case to the jury, which would then become merely
a device for checking the judge. The Supreme Court has held that it was "confusing and incorrect"
to use the Isbell rule in a jury instruction in a circumstantial evidence case. Holland v. United
States, 348 U.S. 121, 139-40 (1954).
In spite of the Court's adverse ruling on the use of this formula as a jury instruction, several
circuits have continued to use the Isbell test as the proper judicial standard by which to assess the
sufficiency of circumstantial evidence when deciding upon a motion for judgment of acquittal. See,
e.g.. Cohen v. United States, 363 F.2d 321, 327 (5th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 957 (1966):
LaConte v. United States, 330 F.2d 700, 701 (10th Cir. 1964). But see Early v. United States, 394
F.2d 117, 118 (10th Cir. 1968). The explanation has two facets: first, the holding in Holland dealt
with the formula's use as a jury instruction; and secondly, the Isbell test has been interpreted to
mean not that the evidence must be inconsistent with every hypothesis of innocence, but rather
that reasonable minds must be able to decide that it is. The Fifth Circuit, the most tenacious
adherent of the Isbell rule (see Panci v. United States, 256 F.2d 308, 312 (5th Cir. 1958)) has
interpreted the test in this manner: "[T]he test to be applied on motion for judgment of acquittal
and on review of denial of such motion is not simply whether in the opinion of the trial judge or
of the appellate court the evidence fails to exclude every reasonable hypothesis, but that of guilt,
but rather whether the jury might reasonably so conclude." Vick v. United States, 216 F.2d 228,
232 (5th Cir. 1954). So interpreted, the Isbell test becomes almost indistinguishable from that
enunciated in Curley. See McCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 338, at 791 (2d ed. E. Cleary 1972).
"United States v. Feinberg, 140 F.2d 592, 594 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 322 U.S. 726 (1944).
2id.
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second justification was that "[w]hile at times it may be practicable to
deal with these as separate Without unreal refinements, in the long run
the line between them is too thin for day to day use. ' 24 A later decision
opined that mandatory consideration of the reasonable doubt standard
2
by the judge would add nothing to the judicial process but confusion.
'
2
This "too thin for'day to day use
argument has been attacked
as illogical and patently untrue.2 It is illogical because it implies that
judges are incapable of distinguishing between evidence which merely
preponderates and that which is capable of persuading reasonable minds
beyond a reasonable doubt, while untrained laymen who comprise the
jury are saddled with that very responsibility.28 This justification for the
"Second Circuit doctrine" is irrational because judges are required to
make this same distinction when they sit in a criminal case without a
jury. 29 Judges must also make a similar distinction in civil cases in which
the clear, cogent, and convincing standard of proof is employed.30
Some proponents of the "Second Circuit doctrine" contend that
the Curley standard requires that a trial judge preempt the function of
the jury by forcing him to decide that the defendant is guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt before he can send the case to the jury.31 This argument not only fails to consider a basic procedural rule of law but is
based on a fundamental misconception of the Curley test. First, the trial
judge in a jury trial is not the trier-of-fact; therefore he may not properly
consider the credibility of the witnesses. 2 In applying the Curley stan241d.
"United States v. Wapnick, 202 F. Supp. 712, 715 (E.D.N.Y. 1962), affd per curiam, 315
F.2d 96 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 374 U.S. 829 (1963). See also 9 WIGMORE, EVIDENCe §§ 2497-98
(3d ed. 1940).
"United States v. Feinberg, 140 F.2d 592, 594 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 322 U.S. 726 (1944).
"See, e.g., United States v. Masiello, 235 F.2d 279, 285 (2d Cir. 1956) (Frank, J., concurring);
United States v. Gonzales Castro, 228 F.2d 807, 808 (2d Cir. 1956) (Frank, J., concurring).
"United States v. Masiello, 235 F.2d 279, 291 (2d Cir. 1956) (Frank, J., concurring); United
States v. Gonzales Castro, 228 F.2d 807, 809 (2d Cir. 1956) (Frank, J., concurring).
"United States v. Masiello, 235 F.2d 279, 291 (2d Cir. 1956) (Frank, J., concurring); United
States v. Gonzales Castro, 228 F.2d 807, 809 (2d Cir. 1956) (Frank, J., concurring).
"United States v. Masiello, 235 F.2d 279, 291 (2d Cir. 1956) (Frank, J.,concurring); United
States v. Gonzales Castro, 228 F.2d 807, 809 (2d Cir. 1956) (Frank, J., concurring); see, e.g.,
Baumgartner v. United States, 322 U.S. 665 (1944) (government's case must fail in a denaturalization proceeding if proof is sufficient only to meet the preponderance standard); Schneiderman v.
United States, 320 U.S. 118 (1943) (same); Deering v. Winona Harvester Works, 155 U.S. 286,
301 (1894) (judge's decision as to prior use of a patented device must be based on proof which
leaves no reasonable doubt).
"E.g., United States v. Masiello, 235 F.2d 279, 284-85 (2d Cir. 1956).
"E.g., United States v. Nelson, 419 F.2d 1237, 1241 (9th Cir. 1969). See also United States
v. Scarpellino, 431 F.2d 475 (8th Cir. 1970) (noting that the same rule applies to appellate courts).
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dard, he must evaluate the sufficiency of the prosecution's evidence in
the light most favorable to the state,3 3 unless a particular piece of

testimony is manifestly incredible, 34 and must leave the establishment
of testimonial inferences to the jury.35 The trial judge is thereby prohib-

ited from preempting the fact-finding function of the jury. Secondly, the
Curley test does not require the judge to find that the defendant is guilty
beyond a reasonable doubt before he can submit the case to the jury;
he must only be able to conclude that reasonable minds could find the
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt."

Perhaps the most serious shortcoming 37 of the "Second Circuit
doctrine" is its emasculation of the presumption of innocence and the
reasonable doubt standard. The presumption of innocence is the cornerstone of our accusatorial system of criminal justice,38 which requires
that the state prove the guilt of the defendant by independent evidence

obtained through police investigation rather than by compelled confession, as under an inquisitorial system.39 Although it has been generally
accepted that the presumption of innocence no longer has any direct
evidentiary significance," the presumption has spawned development of

the reasonable-doubt standard of evidence necessary to sustain a criminal conviction. 4

There are several viable reasons for requiring that guilt be proved
'3E.g., Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80 (1942); United States v. Nelson, 419 F.2d
1237, 1241 (9th Cir. 1969).
3
1See Rodgers v. United States, 402 F.2d 830 (9th Cir. 1968).
"E.g., Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 80 (1942); United States v. Nelson, 419 F.2d
1237, 1241 (9th Cir. 1969).
"See United States v. Masiello, 235 F.2d 279, 286 (2d Cir. 1956).
"There are two other possible constitutional consequences of the "Second Circuit doctrine,"
full consideration of which is prohibited by the strictures of time and space. First, the fifth amendment's proscription against coerced self-incrimination could arguably be breached by the use of
this rule in conjunction with the "waiver doctrine" on appeal. See Comment, The Motion For
Acquittal: A Neglected Safeguard, 70 YALE L.J. 1151, 1152-56 (1961). Secondly, the defendant
might be coerced into abandoning his right to a jury trial by the desire to compel the trial judge to
apply the reasonable doubt standard himself in a bench trial. See text accompanying note 29 supra.
"'he accusatorial nature of our system of criminal justice is documented by various provisions of the Bill of Rights. See, e.g., U.S. CONST. amend. V (privilege against self-incrimination),
amend. VI (right to confrontation and compulsory process), amend. VIII (right to bail).
39
Watts v. Indiana, 338 U.S. 49, 54-55 (1949).
11J. THAYER, A PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW 566-76 (1898):
9 WIGNIORE, EVIDENCE § 2511(2) (3d ed. 1940).
"In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363 (1970); MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note
23, § 341(c). For a definition of the reasonable doubt standard which distinguishes it from the
preponderance standard, see United States v. Masiello, 235 F.2d 279, 286 (2d Cir. 1956) (Frank,
J., concurring).
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beyond a reasonable doubt in criminal trials. The very nature of the
criminal process mandates adoption of a more stringent standard of

guilt than in a civil action. While an erroneous judgment for one party
in a civil case is no worse than an incorrect decision for his adversary,

the conviction of an innocent man is a loss for all society. Not only does
the convicted innocent defendant suffer an unjust loss of liberty, but the
state's interest in a precise judicial system is defeated,4" and the legiti-

macy and popular support of that system is undermined. 3 In addition,
the criminal sanction of imprisonment and concomitant stigmatization

is much more serious than the pecuniary consequence of a civil action.44
Finally, there is a basic imbalance in resources, prestige, and power-all
in favor of the state. 5 For these reasons, the Supreme Court explicitly

held in In re Winship4" that the fourteenth amendment's due process
clause "protects the accused against conviction except upon proof be-

yond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime
with which he is charged."

The "Second Circuit doctrine" did not directly remove the reasonable doubt standard from the criminal trial, as the jury was always instructed that they must find the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable
doubt.47 However, the rule did have the effect of preventing judicial
consideration of the reasonable doubt standard. Judge Frank characterized this result as a reduction of the criminal standard "to little more
than a verbal ritual, a ceremonial set of words included in the judge's
charge." 49 As a later Second Circuit opinion noted, "the requirement of
proof beyond a reasonable doubt is a direction to the jury" which "can4

Cf. Comment, 70 YALE L.J., supra note 40, at 1158.
aIn re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
"Id. at 363. MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 23, § 341(c), at 798: "The consequences
to the life, liberty and good name of the accused from an erroneous conviction of a crime are
usually more serious than the effects of an erroneous judgment in a civil case."
"See Dession, The Technique of Public Order: Evolving Concepts of Criminal Law, 5
BUFFALO L. REV. 22, 40 (1955): "To prosecute is far easier than to defend. The prosecutor is
normally assumed to represent right and justice, and on top of that he almost invariably enjoys
far more investigative assistance and resources generally." For a contrary opinion by a principal
in the "Second Circuit doctrine" debate, see United States v. Garsson, 291 F. 646. 649 (S.D.N.Y.
1923) (L. Hand, J.).
46397 U.S. 358, 364 (1970).
"See United States v. Gonzales Castro, 228 F.2d 807, 808 (2d Cir. 1956) (per curiam); United
States v. Feinberg, 140 F.2d 592, 594 (2d Cir. 1944); United States v. Valenti, 134 F.2d 362, 364
(2d Cir. 1943).
"United States v. Masiello, 235 F.2d 279, 287 (2d Cir. 1956) (Frank, J., concurring).
Old. at 288.
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not be accorded a quantitative value other than as a general cautionary
admonition." 5 Consequently, under the "Second Circuit doctrine"
there was no viable means of judicial evaluation of the application of
the reasonable doubt standard by the jury. The judge was denied the
opportunity to prevent the jury from operating beyond its province, for
he no longer had any efficient means to prevent the jury from reaching
a verdict based on conjecture, speculation, passion, or prejudice."'
Application of the "Second Circuit doctrine" presented the trial
judge with two anomalous situations.52 First, when the prosecution's
case was sufficient to pass the civil preponderance test, he had to submit
it to the jury to apply the reasonable doubt standard even though he was
thoroughly convinced that no reasonable mind could possibly determine
that the defendant was guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.5" Secondly,
he had to refuse to grant a judgment n.o.v. if the jury returned a guilty
verdict in spite of his conviction that the jury's verdict was unreasonable. 4 These situations were forced upon the trial judge because the
"Second Circuit doctrine" effectively precluded him from using the
reasonable doubt standard as "either a pre-verdict or post-verdict check
on the jury." 55 As Judge Frank said: "This means.

. .

that a man may

be jailed or put to death, although the trial judge and the upper court
are clearly convinced that the man's guilt has not been proved beyond
a reasonable doubt (i.e., they are sure that no reasonable men would
believe that his guilt has been thus proven)." 6
The rejection of the "Second Circuit doctrine" was not only wise,
it was inevitable in light of recent developments. As previously noted,
the Second Circuit, at the time of the Taylor decision, was the only
federal Court of Appeals not employing the Curley test." The natural
evolution toward uniformity among the circuits dictated the result in
Taylor.5s
I'United States v. Valenti, 134 F.2d 362, 364 (2d Cir. 1943).

"'See United States v. Gonzales Castro, 228 F.2d 807, 808 (2d Cir. 1956) (Frank, J., concurring); Curley v. United States, 160 F.2d 229, 232 (D.C. Cir. 1947).
"See United States v. Masiello, 235 F.2d 279, 287 (2d Cir. 1956) (Frank, J., concurring);
United States v. Wapniek, 202 F. Supp. 712, 714-15 (E.D.N.Y. 1962).
"See United States v. Masiello, 235 F.2d 279, 287 (2d Cir. 1956) (Frank, J., concurring):
United States v. Wapnick, 202 F. Supp. 712, 714-15 (E.D.N.Y. 1962).
"See United States v. Masiello, 235 F.2d 279, 288 (2d Cir. 1956) (Frank, J., concurring);
United States v. Wapnick, 202 F. Supp. 712, 714-15 (E.D.N.Y. 1962).
"United States v. Masiello, 235 F.2d 279, 288 (2d Cir. 1956) (Frank, J., concurring).
"'United States v. Gonzales Castro, 228 F.2d 807, 808 (2d Cir. 1956) (Frank, J., concurring).
57See note I I supra.
"The injustice of having two different standards within the same judicial system is obvious.
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Furthermore, the Supreme Court had indicated its disapproval of
the "Second Circuit doctrine" in a number of cases.59 In a slightly
different context"0 in In re Winship,61 the Court expressed disagreement
with the "too thin for day to day use" argument:
"[W]e reject the Court of Appeals' suggestion that there is, in any
event, only a 'tenuous difference' between the reasonable-doubt and
preponderance standards. The suggestion is singularly unpersuasive. In
this very case, the tridl judge's ability to distinguish between the two
standards enabled him to make a finding of guilt that he conceded he
might not have made under the standard of proof beyond a reasonable
doubt."
In United States v. Vuitch,6" the Court had stated that "a court should
always set aside a jury verdict of guilt when there is not evidence from
which a jury could find a defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt."
The significance of this dictum is enhanced in light of the holding in In
re Winship3 that the due process clause requires proof beyond a reasonable doubt for conviction in a criminal case and the Court's rejection
of the justification for the "Second Circuit doctrine" as "singularly
unpersuasive."
The next logical step for the Supreme Court would have been to
declare that the Constitution mandates the application of the reasonable
doubt standard by the trial judge in assessing the sufficiency of the
prosecution's evidence in a criminal case so that due process is not
denied to a criminal defendant by a jury verdict based on mere conjecture, speculation, passion or prejudice. The decision in Taylor makes
Supreme Court consideration of this issue unnecessary.
JOHN MICHAEL

Kops

A defendant should not be sent to prison in the Second Circuit when the identical case against
him in the Fifth Circuit would result in a directed verdict of acquittal.
"See, e.g., Mortensen v. United States, 322 U.S. 369, 374 (1944):
But we have never hestiated to examine a record to determine whether there was
any competent and substantial evidence fairly tending to support the verdict. Cf. Abrams
v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 619. Our examination of the record.in this case convinces
us that there was a complete lack of relevant evidence from which the jury could properly
find or infer, beyond a reasonable doubt, that petitioners [were guilty].
In American Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 787 (1946), the Court stated: "The
verdict in a criminal case is sustained only when there is 'relevant evidence from which the jury
could properly find or infer, beyond a reasonable doubt,' that the accused is guilty."
WHere, there was a bench trial in a New York State juvenile court.
61397 U.S. 358, 367 (1970).
62402 U.S. 62, 72 n.7 (1971).
-397 U.S. 358, 367 (1970).

